Abstract. When goals fall in decidable logic fragments, users of proofassistants expect automation. However, despite the availability of decision procedures, automation does not come for free. The reason is that decision procedures do not generate proof terms. In this paper, we show how to design efficient and lightweight reflexive tactics for a hierarchy of quantifier-free fragments of integer arithmetics. The tactics can cope with a wide class of linear and non-linear goals. For each logic fragment, off-the-shelf algorithms generate certificates of infeasibility that are then validated by straightforward reflexive checkers proved correct inside the proof-assistant. This approach has been prototyped using the Coq proofassistant. Preliminary experiments are promising as the tactics run fast and produce small proof terms.
Introduction
In an ideal world, proof assistants would be theorem provers. They would be fed with theorems and would either generate a proof of them (if one exists) or reject them (if none exists). Unfortunately, in real life, theorems can be undecidable Yet, theorems often fall in decidable fragments. For those, users of proof assistants expect the proof process to be discharged to dedicated efficient decision procedures. However, using off-the-shelf provers is complicated by the fact that they cannot be trusted. A decision procedure, that when given as input a supposedly-so theorem, laconically answers back yes is useless. Proof assistants only accept proofs which they can check by their own means.
Approaches to obtain proofs from decision procedures usually require a substantial engineering efforts and a deep understanding of the internals of the decision procedure. A common approach consists in instrumenting the procedure so that it generates proof traces that are replayed in the proof-assistant. The Coq omega tactic by Pierre Crégut ([9] chapter 17) is representative of this trend. The tactics is a decision procedure for quantifier-free linear integer arithmetics. It generates Coq proof terms from traces obtained from an instrumented version of the Omega test [22] . Another approach, implemented by the Coq ring tactics [13] , is to prove correct the decision procedure inside the proof-assistant and use computational reflection. In this case, both the computational complexity of the decision procedure and the complexity of proving it correct are limiting factors.
In this paper, we adhere to the so-called sceptical approach advocated by Harrison and Théry [16] . The key insight is to separate proof-search from proofchecking. Proof search is delegated to fine-tuned external tools which produce certificates to be checked by the proof-assistant. In this paper, we present the design, in the Coq proof-assistant, of a tactics for a hierarchy of quantifier-free fragments of integer arithmetics. The originality of the approach is that proof witnesses, i.e., certificates, are computed by black-box off-the-shelf provers. The soundness of a reflexive certificate checker is then proved correct inside the proofassistant. For the logic fragments we consider, checkers are considerably simpler than provers. Hence, using a pair (untrusted prover, proved checker) is a very lightweight and efficient implementation technique to make decision procedures available to proof-assistants.
The contributions of this paper are both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, we put the shed on mathematical theorems that provide infeasibility certificates for linear and non-linear fragments of integer arithmetics. On the practical side, we show how to use these theorems to design powerful and space-and-time efficient checkers for these certificates. The implementation has been carried out for the Coq proof-assistant. Experiments show that our new reflexive tactic for linear arithmetics outperforms state-of-the-art Coq tactics.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 recalls the principles of reflection proofs. Section 3 presents the mathematical results on which our certificate checkers are based on. Section 4 describe our implementation of these checkers in the Coq proof-assistant. Section 5 compares to related work and concludes.
Principle of reflection proofs
Reflection proofs are a feature of proof-assistants embedding a programming language. (See Chapter 16 of the Coq'Art book [2] for a presentation of reflection proofs in Coq.) In essence, this technique is reducing a proof to a computation. Degenerated examples of this proof pattern are equality proofs of ground, i.e., variable free, arithmetic expressions. Suppose that we are given the proof goal 4 + 8 + 15 + 16 + 23 + 42 = 108
Its proof is quite simple: evaluate 4 + 8 + 15 + 16 + 23 + 42; check that the result is indeed 108. Reflection proofs become more challenging when goals involves variables. Consider, for instance, the following goal where x is universally quantified:
Because the expression contain variables, evaluation alone is unable to prove the equality. The above goal requires a more elaborate reflection scheme.
Prover-based reflection
Reflection proofs are set up by the following steps:
1. encode logical propositions into symbolic expressions F ; 2. provide an evaluation function . : Env → F → P rop that given an environment binding variables and a symbolic expression returns a logical proposition; 3. implement a semantically sound and computable function prover : F → bool verifying ∀ef , prover (ef ) = true ⇒ ∀env , ef env .
A reflexive proof proceeds in the following way. First, we construct an environment env binding variables. (Typically, variables in symbolic expressions are indexes and environments map indexes to variables.) Then, the goal formula f is replaced by ef env such that, by computation, ef env evaluates to f . As the prover is sound, if prover(ef ) returns true, we conclude that f holds.
Example 1 Following the methodology described above, we show how goals of the form c 1 × x + . . . c n × x = c × x (where the c i s are integer constants and x is the only universally quantified variable) can be solved by reflection.
-Such formulae can be coded by pairs
-The semantics function . is defined by l, c x = listExpr(x, l) = c×x where
-Given a pair (l, c), the prover computes the sum of the elements in l and checks equality with the constant c.
To make decision procedure available to proof-assistants, the reflexive proverbased approach is very appealing. It is conceptually simple and can be applied to any textbook decision procedure. Moreover, besides soundness, it allows to reason about the completeness of the prover. As a result, the end-user of the proof-assistant gets maximum confidence. Upon success, the theorem holds; upon failure, the theorem is wrong.
Checker-based reflection
On the one hand, provers efficiency is due to efficient data-structures, clever algorithms and fine-tuned heuristics. On the other hand, manageable soundness proofs usually hinge upon simple algorithms. In any case, reflection proofs require runtime efficiency. Obviously, these facts are difficult to reconcile. To obtain a good trade-off between computational efficiency and proof simplicity, we advocate implementing and proving correct certificate checkers instead of genuine provers. Compared to provers, checkers take a certificate as an additional input and verify the following property:
The benefits are twofold : checkers are simpler and faster. Complexity theory ascertains that checkers run faster than provers. In particular, contrary to all known provers, checkers for NP-complete decision problems have polynomial complexity. A reflexive proof of ef env now amounts to providing a certificate cert such that checker(cert, t) evaluates to true. As they are checked inside a proof-assistant, certificates can be generated by any untrusted optimised procedure.
Using certificates and reflexive checkers to design automated tactics is not a new idea. For instance, proof traces generated by instrumented decision procedures can be understood as certificates. In this case, reflexive checkers are trace validators which verify the logical soundness of the proof steps recorded in the trace. The Coq romega tactic [8] is representative of this trace-based approach: traces generated by an instrumented version of the Omega test [22] act as certificates that are validated by a reflexive checker.The drawback of this method is that instrumentation is an intrusive task and require to dig into the internals of the decision procedure. In the following, we present conjunctive fragments of integer arithmetics for which certificate generators are genuine off-the-shelf provers. The advantage is immediate: provers are now black-boxes. Moreover, the checkers are quite simple to implement and prove correct.
Certificates for integer arithmetics
In this part, we study a hierarchy of three quantifier-free fragments of integer arithmetics. We describe certificates, off-the-shelf provers and certificate checkers associated to them. We consider formulae that are conjunctions of inequalities and we are interested in proving the unsatisfiability of these inequalities. Formally, formulae of interest have the form:
where the e i s are fragment-specific integer expressions and the x i s are universally quantified variables.
For each fragment, we shall prove a theorem of the following general form:
In essence, such a theorem establish that cert is a certificate of the infeasibility of the e i s. We then show that certificates can be generated by off-the-shelf algorithms and that Cond is decidable and can be efficiently implemented by a checker algorithm.
Potential constraints
To begin with, consider potential constraints. These are constraints of the form x − y + c ≥ 0. Deciding the infeasibility of conjunctions of such constraints amounts to finding a cycle of negative weight in a graph such that a edge x c → y corresponds to a constraint x − y + c ≥ 0 [1, 21] 1 .
Theorem 1
∃π ∈ Path,
Proof. Ad absurdum, we suppose that we have x − y + c ≥ 0 (each element of the sum being positive). We conclude that the total weight of cycles is necessarily positive. It follows that the existence of a cycle of negative weight c yields a contradiction.
As a result, a negative cycle is a certificate of infeasibility of a conjunction of potential constraints.
Bellmann-Ford shortest path algorithm is a certificate generator which runs in complexity O(n × k) where n is the number of nodes (or variables) and k is the number of edges (or constraints). However, this algorithm does not find the best certificate i.e., the negative cycle of shortest length. Certificates, i.e., graph cycles, can be coded by a list of binary indexes -each of them identifying one of the k constraints. The worst-case certificate is then a Hamiltonian circuit which is a permutation of the k constraint indexes. Its asymptotic size is therefore k × log(k):
Verifying a certificate consists in checking that:
1. indexes are bound to genuine expressions; 2. verify that expressions form a cycle; 3. compute the total weight of the cycle and check its negativity This can be implemented in time linear in the size of the certificate.
Linear constraints
The linear fragment of arithmetics might be the most widely used. It consists of formulae built over the following expressions:
Over Z, Farkas's Lemma is sufficient to provide infeasibility certificates for systems of inequalities.
Lemma 2 (Weakened Farkas's Lemma (over Z)) Let A : Z m×n be a integervalued matrix and b : Z m be a integer-valued vector. where p i = p i × lcm/q i and lcm is the least common multiple of the q i s.
Worst-case estimates of the size of the certificates are inherited from the theory of integer and linear programming (see for instance [23] ). Using Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, the next Corollary gives a coarse upper-bound of the bit size of integer certificates.
Corollary 1 (Bit size of integer certificates)
The bit size of integer certificates is bounded by 4k
Proof. Let cert Z = [p 1 ; . . . ; p k ] be the certificate obtained from a rational cer-
At worse, the q i s are relatively prime and lcm = Π n i=1 q i .
By Theorem 2, we conclude the proof and obtain the 4k 3 (k + 1)(σ + 1) bound.
Optimising certificates over the rationals is reasonable. Rational certificates are produced in polynomial time. Moreover, the worst-case size of the integer certificates is kept reasonable. Checking a certificate cert amounts to 1. checking the positiveness of the integers in cert; 2. computing the matrix-vector product A t · cert and verifying that the result is the null vector; 3. computing the scalar product b t · cert and verifying its strict positivity Overall, this leads to a quadratic-time O(n × k) checker in the number of arithmetic operations.
Polynomial constraints
For our last fragment, we consider unrestricted expressions built over variables, integer constants, addition and multiplication.
e ∈ Expr ::= x | c | e 1 + e 2 | e 1 × e 2
As it reduces to solving diophantine equations, the logical fragment we consider is not decidable over the integers. However, it is a result by Tarski [26] that the first order logic R, +, * , 0 is decidable. In the previous section, by lifting our problem over the rationals, we traded incompleteness for efficiency. Here, we trade incompleteness for decidability. In 1974, Stengle generalises Hilbert's nullstellenstaz to systems of polynomial inequalities [25] . As a matter of fact, this provides a positivstellensatz, i.e., a theorem of positivity, which states a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a solution to systems of polynomial inequalities. Over the integers, unlike Farkas's lemma, Stengle's positivstellensatz yields sound infeasibility certificates for conjunctions of polynomial inequalities.
be a finite set of polynomials. The cone of P (Cone(P )) is the smallest set such that
Theorem 3 states sufficient conditions for infeasibility certificates:
Theorem 3 (Weakened Positivstellensatz) Let P ⊆ Z[x 1 , . . . , x n ] be a finite set of polynomials.
Proof. By adbsurdum, we suppose that we have p∈P p(x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≥ 0 for some x 1 ,. . . , x n . By routine induction over the definition of a Cone, we prove that any polynomial p ∈ Cone(P ) is such that p(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is positive. This contradicts the existence of the polynomial cert which uniformly evaluates to −1.
Certificate generators explore the cone to pick a certificate. Stengle's result [25] shows that only a restricted (though infinite) part of the cone needs to be considered. A certificate cert can be decomposed into a finite sum of products of the following form:
i is a sum of squares polynomial.
As pointed out by Parrilo [20] , a layered certificate search can be carried out by increasing the formal degree of the certificate. For a given degree, finding a certificate amounts to finding polynomials (of known degree) that are sums of squares. This is a problem that can be solved efficiently (in polynomial time) by recasting it as a semidefinite program [27] . The key insight is that a polynomial q is a sum of square if and only if it can be written as
for some positive semidefinite matrix Q and some vector (m 1 , . . . , m n ) of linearly independent monomials.
An infeasibility certificates is a polynomial which belongs to the cone and is equivalent to −1. Using a suitable encoding, cone membership can be tested in linear time. Equivalence with −1 can be checked by putting the polynomial in Horner's normal form.
Implementation in the Coq proof-assistant
In this part, we present the design of the Coq reflexive tactics micromega 2 . This tactics solves linear and non-linear goals using the certificates and certificate generators described in Section 3. For the linear case, experiments show that micromega outperforms the existing Coq (r)omega tactics both in term of proofterm size and checking time.
Encoding of formulae
As already mentioned in section 2.1, to set up a reflection proof, logical sentences are encoded into syntactic terms. The eval_expr function maps syntactic expressions to arithmetic expressions. It is defined by structural induction over the structure of Expr. The eval function generates formulae of the form e 1 (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≥ 0 → . . . → e k (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≥ 0 → F alse. By simple propositional reasoning, such a formula is equivalent to ¬ k i=1 e i (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≥ 0 which is exactly the logical fragment studied in Section 3.
Proving the infeasibility criterion
At the core of our tactics are theorems which are reducing infeasibility of formulae to the existence of certificates. In the following, we present our formalisation of Stengle's Positivstellensatz in Coq. The cone of a set of polynomials is defined by an inductive predicate:
Inductive Cone ( P : list Expr ) : Expr → Prop := | IsGen : ∀ p , In p P → Cone P p | IsSquare : ∀ p , Cone P ( Power p 2) | IsMult : ∀ p q , Cone P p → Cone P q → Cone P ( Mult p q ) | IsAdd : ∀ p q , Cone P p → Cone P q → Cone P ( Add p q ) | IsPos : ∀ c , c ≥ 0 → Cone P ( C c ).
The fifth rule IsPos is redundant and absent from the formal definition of a cone (Definition 1). Indeed, any positive integer can be decomposed into a sum of square. It is added for convenience and to allow a simpler and faster decoding of certificates. We are then able to state (and prove) our weakened positivstellensatz.
Theorem po si tiv st el le ns at z : ∀ ( f : Formulae ) , ( ∃ ( e : Expr ) , Cone f e ∧ ( ∀ env ' , eval_expr env ' e = -1)) → ∀ env , eval env f .
Moreover, micromega scales far better than romega. It is also worth noting than romega fails to complete the last two benchmarks. For the last benchmark, the origin of the failure is not fully elucidated. For the penultimate one, a stackoverflow exception is thrown while type-checking the certificate. instances, the two tactics generate proof-terms of similar size. For big instances, proof-terms of generated by micromega are smaller than those produced by romega. Moreover, their size is more closely correlated to the problem size. On the negative side, both tactics are using a huge amount of memory. (For the biggest problems, the memory skyrockets up to 2.5 GB.) Further investigations is needed to fully understand this behaviour.
Related work and conclusion
In this paper, we have identified logical fragments for which certificate generators are off-the-shelf decision procedures (or algorithms) and reflexive certificate checkers are proved correct inside the proof-assistant. Using the same approach, Grégoire et al., [14] check Pocklington certificates to get efficient reflexive Coq proofs that a number is prime. In both cases, the checkers benefit from the performance of the novel Coq virtual machine [12] .
For Isabelle/HOL, recent works attest the efficiency of reflexive approaches. Chaieb and Nipkow have proved correct Cooper's decision procedure for Presburger arithmetics [7] . To obtain fast reflexive proofs, the HOL program is compiled into ML code and run inside the HOL kernel. Most related to ours is the work by Obua [19] which is using a reflexive checker to verify certificates generated by the Simplex. Our work extends this approach by considering more general certificates, namely positivstellensatz certificates.
To prove non-linear goals, Harrison mentions (chapter 9.2 of the HOL Light tutorial [15] ) his use of semidefinite programming. The difference with our approach is that the HOL Light checker needs not to be proved correct but is a Caml program of type cert → term → thm. Dynamically, the HOL Light kernel ensures that theorems can only be constructed using sound logical inferences.
As decision procedures get more and more sophisticated and fine-tuned, the need for trustworthy checkers has surged. For instance, the state-of-the-art zChaff SAT solver is now generating proof traces [29] . When proof traces exist, experiments show that they can be efficiently rerun inside a proof-assistant. Using Isabelle/HOL, Weber [28] reruns zChaff traces to solve problems that Isabelle/HOL decision procedure could not cope with. Fontaine et al., [11] are using a similar approach to solve quantifier-free formulae with uninterpreted symbols by rerunning proof traces generated by the Harvey SMT prover [10] .
In Proof Carrying Code [18] , a piece of code is downloaded packed with a checkable certificate -a proof accessing that it is not malicious. Certificate generation is done ahead-of-time while certificate checking is done at download time. Previous work has shown how to bootstrap a PCC infrastructure using a general-purpose proof-assistant like Coq [6, 3, 4] . In this context, the triples (certificate,checkers,prover) defined here could be used to efficiently check arithmetic verification conditions arising from the analysis of programs.
